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abstract: This article questions the reason behind ethics in caregiving 
services for people with serious intellectual disabilities, the reasons changes 
have taken place in medicine, in the kinds of illnesses, social changes and 
changes in how hospitality is envisioned, which lead us to reconsider 
the usual way of doing things, the traditional morals on which their 
treatment has been based. However, the traditional ways of dealing with 
those disabled individuals have also become obsolete and are ethically 
reproachable: based on charity and beneficence, goodwill and paternalism, 
if not on ignorance and vulnerability.
Likewise, we suggest that the concept of dignity be revived in order to 
serve as the underpinning of respect for people who are not autonomous, 
rather extremely dependent and will remain so for their entire life. Bioethics 
has unquestionably put too much stress on fostering and respecting 
autonomy, but it has not always outlined what kind of dignity should be 
recognised for a person who can hardly serve as their own moral agent. 
Thus, we suggest making a distinction between dignity in the lax sense, 
a dignity that everyone has, and dignity in the strict sense, a dignity that 
only a moral agent can have.
In this way, all people have dignity, both the most perverse murderers 
and the anencephalic child, but neither has dignity in the strict sense: the 
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former, because they have abused their autonomy and the latter because 
they are unable to exercise this autonomy. And we, the ones who interact 
with them, gamble with our strict dignity in how we treat them if we 
forget that they are always people, despite the immorality of the former 
and the disability of the latter.
We also stress the ethics that must be made explicit in services targeted at 
disabled people: civic ethics, or justice at the service of dignity; professional 
and organisational ethics, at the service of the disabled individuals’ quality 
of life, with attention on the kind of relationship established with the 
patient and the families and their concepts of quality.
We finish by upholding the need, fundamentally in the institutions where 
these people live, to not depersonalise treatment. This depersonalisation 
takes place when the relationship is standardised for the smoothing running 
of the centre, when disabled people’s degree of interaction or other 
affective-sexual dimensions are not taken into account.
Keywords: Intellectual disability, quality of life, dignity in the lax sense, 
dignity in the strict sense, civic ethics, professional ethics, organisational 
ethics, charity, beneficence, justice.
INtRoductIoN
In this article we aim to address the issue of why we need ethics in 
caregiving services for people with serious intellectual disabilities. To do 
so, we shall begin by explaining each of the words in the title.
By ethics we mean a critical-rational reflection on the customs or 
habits which are the morals (mos-moris). This reflection is conducted 
with a distance in order to see whether the moral responses that guide 
behaviour have become obsolete because they arose in a highly specific 
and determined context (a context with given values and knowledge), or 
whether they remain valid and why. The specifically moral question lies 
in what we should do, while the ethical question, by antonomasia, is why 
we should do it. In this way, what ethics is best poised to provide, and 
what we should expect of it, is the arguments and reflections that help us 
to later find the most appropriate habits, customs and values to provide 
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answers to the questions that reality poses us about what depends on us, 
about what is within our reach.
A service is always an interpersonal relationship in which someone 
does something for another person. A service is different to a mere 
product because its quality depends on the interpersonal relationship. And 
caregiving services are services in which one person cares for another. 
Kant reminds us that everything has its price, while people have their 
dignity. In German, Achtung means both attention and respect: attention 
means stopping, concentrating on the other, while respect, from the Latin 
respicere, means a watchful look (Esquirol, 2006, 65).
Autonomy means self-determination. According to Kant, the author 
who made the concept of autonomy fashionable (Kant, 2000) in the 
moral realm, dignity is grounded on autonomy, and precisely the people 
deserving of our care in this job are people who have dignity but no 
autonomy, and will never again have this autonomy, if in fact they ever 
had it. They are people with a serious intellectual disability. When a 
disability is intellectual, autonomy is hindered because the first condition 
for being autonomous is having the ability to grasp reality and information 
in order to be able to take decisions on it with the absence of obstacles 
or pressures (either internal or external) and in coherence with their own 
scale of values (Beauchamps & Childress, 1999).
Autonomy is always a degree on a continuum, a process during which 
we can self-determine to a greater or lesser extent, and in these individuals 
this degree is strictly curtailed. The people we are talking about here do 
not have this autonomy precisely because their disability, their lack of 
power, lies in not being able to think for themselves, nor consequently 
to live by themselves. Their disability is not partial, an inability to 
perform a given function, but serious. The cause of their disability is 
almost always a pathological process that is not only irreversible but 
also often degenerative. 
Yet, following Kant, this does not mean that they lack dignity. It still 
makes sense to perform an ethical reflection on the caregiving services 
for people with serious intellectual disabilities precisely because they are 
still people. We must thus distinguish between two degrees of dignity: a 
lax sense, which everyone has as a person (end in itself, absolute value, 
source of all other value) who might have managed to develop autonomy 
if this pathological process had not occurred that impeded the intellectual 
development needed to be an autonomous being and be able to talk about 
dignity in the strict sense (Román & Gutiérrez, 2008, 427-434). Dignity 
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in the strict sense would be the kind of dignity that is the object of 
personal conquest, the veritable purpose of any moral undertaking that 
entails developing the degrees of personal autonomy, managing to think 
for oneself and living in coherence.
Thus, every person has dignity, from the most perverse of murderers 
to the anencephalic child, yet neither of them has dignity in the strict 
sense: the former because he abuses (Camps, 2006, 6-9) his autonomy 
and the latter because he is unable to use it. And we, those of us who 
interact with them, gamble with our strict dignity in how we treat them 
if we forget that they are always, despite their immorality or disability, 
people.
why thIs QuestIoN today?
changES
If we wonder about ethics in the care of individuals with serious 
intellectual disabilities it is because either changes have taken place that 
lead us to question the traditional way of dealing with these people or new 
questions have arisen that we have not asked until now. Let us examine 
some of these changes.
changes in medicine
In 30 years, medicine has changed more than in its entire previous 
history; these changes have always come under the euphoric umbrella of 
progress, that is, all changes are painted as being for the best, like a step 
forward. This has aroused in many people exaggerated expectations about 
the power of medicine, expectations that have often not been fulfilled. For 
example, medicine has made great strides in diagnoses but not as many 
in therapy: we might know what we have, but we do not necessarily 
know how to treat it.
With people with serious intellectual disabilities, we may know 
what they have, their diagnosis, but the most appropriate treatment 
will never wholly cure them, nor is it strictly medical-biological, rather 
it entails being cared for all their lives. For this reason, the care that 
they need and deserve should be not only health-related but social- and 
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health-related at the same time. Consequently, the doctors have to work 
with psychologists, with physical therapists, with social workers, with 
caregivers (often non-technical staff, but the ones who spend the most 
time with the patient), and they must do so in a team and with a multi-
disciplinary approach. 
changes in kinds of illnesses
Due to techno-scientific progress, economic progress and progress in 
the welfare state, the life expectancy of many people with mental illnesses 
has been extended until they die of old age. People with disabilities can 
also live many years, a circumstance that did not hold true in the past 
due to social rejection, family negligence, a lack of social and health care 
and other factors. Longevity also generates other mental pathologies 
(Alzheimer) which extend life even though the person cannot improve, 
creating major medical and care-based dependencies for many years. 
Hence the need to adapt the laws (such as the law on dependency and 
the promotion of autonomy) and to create centres to house sufferers of 
both the new illnesses that trigger major disabilities and dependencies and 
the old illnesses that are no longer mortal.
social changes
There have been major social changes: women joining the workforce 
has meant that care of these people now comes from outside the home and 
the family, as they delegate this responsibility to the centre. Furthermore, 
the very concept of family has become more complex.
Until relatively recently, different cultural or educational levels could 
be found at centres and residences, but not different cultures. Now 
multiculturalism, which is reaching these centres both through ill individuals 
and their families and through professionals and caregivers in general, requires 
us to explicitly outline the values behind the concepts with which we work, 
because they are no longer shared by common sense. This includes what 
we mean by quality, what meaning we assign to the normal concept of 
hygiene, meals, privacy and the like. These social changes make caregiving 
services in general more complex.
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changes in hospitality
When people suffer from a serious intellectual disability from which they 
cannot recover, they move into residences where they will live their entire 
life; the residence comes to be their home, which requires a certain kind of 
hospitality, a way of caring for them and being aware of their needs. This is 
quite different to a short or middle-term stay at a hospital or a centre, which 
the person knows is temporary, for a more or less specific period of time. 
As the people we are discussing are chronic residents, we must reconsider 
what kind of hospitality we are offering them beyond treatments based on 
merely biological considerations, and what model of care. And it should 
consist of a great deal of personalised care because their stay is forever 
and personalised care makes the patients feel at home.
Right now, hospitality and the quality of care do not depend so much 
on the diagnosis as on the treatment, on the service as it is perceived by the 
patient and the family, who are the ones who end up taking the decisions 
on behalf of the disabled person. In these cases, the model of personal 
relationship between the social-healthcare structure and the patient and 
family is quite different to what is usual in other kinds of centres.
moral obSolEScEncE 
Yet in addition to the changes to which we must adapt, there is also a 
need to spur change because the usual ways of doing things, our morals, 
also become obsolete. Thus, we must claim that people with intellectual 
disabilities must be cared for out of justice, not out of either Christian 
charity or Hippocratic beneficence. 
charity and beneficence
Traditionally, the religious orders, or the benevolence and altruistic 
beneficence of certain professionals, were what determined which service 
and which treatment, and they did so through their religious and altruistic 
morals. The goal is not to leave the care for these people in the hands 
of charity, mercy or compassion in a religious sense. This is a discourse 
that comes from religious perspectives, from personal maxims. Yet the 
ethics of people with disabilities has to come first, and the order of factors 
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alters the result, a civic ethics based on the right to healthcare. The idea 
is to provide a service that respects the civic minimums because care for 
these people must be guaranteed through justice and recognition of the 
respect that personal dignity deserves.
Good will and paternalism 
Often this was dealt with not only from a religious perspective, but also 
out of paternalism and good will without the consent of the disabled person 
(within his limited capacities) or the family. It was thought that good will 
was enough, although as even popular wisdom claimed, the road to hell is 
paved with good intentions. That is, through paternalism society used to 
fall into the error of hyper-protecting and supplanting that started as good 
intentions but ended up in enlightened despotism: everything for the people, 
but without the people.
Justice demands the consent of the affected parties in conditions of 
information and symmetry. Obviously, people with serious intellectual 
disabilities are unable to give this consent, but we must underscore the 
fact that they are the subject of care, not merely the object of dedication 
and protection.
ignorance and vulnerability
In other times, the families themselves, out of ignorance as to how to 
deal with people with disabilities, enhanced their vulnerability, and they 
did so from totally different vantage points:
Sometimes because they hid the people in the family who were not 
normal, thus creating an impersonal environment, secluding them and 
reducing them to a mere being, like a plant. By not fostering interpersonal 
interaction, they increased their solitude and their disability. They may 
have done so out of good will, to save everyone from suffering. Later 
there were efforts to combat this through normalisation.
However, in other periods society fell into the error of exaggerated 
normalisation, aiming to get these disabled people accepted and normalised 
into society. And they created the immersion of children at schools and 
then their job placement in certain socially conscious companies (some of 
which even aimed to be competitive). The problem then was that their 
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difference, their disability, was denied, because they were the same and 
deserved the same treatment. By wanting excessively to normalise, who 
they really were was ignored, people with disabilities compared to the 
abilities regarded as normal for living under self-determination and with 
a certain degree of self-sufficiency.
It is necessary to make people aware that these creatures from another 
planet (following the title of a book written by the mother of a girl 
with Rett Syndrome) (Pedrosa, 2008) can have convulsions at any time, 
and trying to introduce them into a normal school is good neither for 
them (it endangers their life if the school does not have many special 
conditions) nor for the other children (who cannot hold a normal class). 
What does normalisation mean when people are wholly dependent on 
an organisation? As psychiatrist Josep Ramos so aptly put it, abusing 
normalisation means denying the limitations of the disabled person, 
thus exposing them excessively to frustration and failure. Is dependency 
normal ? However, denying their dependence to make them normal is a 
contradiction. They cannot have the same rights, and certainly not the 
same responsibilities. They deserve other, more specific rights because they 
are different. Precisely these individuals’ capacity to take care of themselves 
is what requires us to reconsider the most appropriate treatment for their 
dignity, for their welfare, always accepting their difference, which is 
exactly their dependence on abled people. Dependency is not a shameful 
condition: the disabled deserve (are worthy of) special attention because 
they are special, and this is how their education, work, treatment and 
environment must be.
whIch ethIcs?
EThicS aS a criTical-raTional and dialogic ExErciSE
Since morals are becoming obsolete, since the sciences will continue to 
provide knowledge and make changes in the way we handle things and 
proceed, the habit that we must foster the most is the critical, ongoing 
reconsideration of our customs and habits based on the constant suspicion 
that the way we act is inevitably filled with prejudices, as Gadamer 
reminds us.
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habits, customs and arguments
We need more than morals and ethics, because this is what enables 
us to amend the different customs and habits that are the moral ones 
today and obsolete tomorrow. Ethics (morals considered) indirectly try, 
through the morals experienced, to guide decision-making in morally 
plural societies. It does so using the dialogic, deliberative methodology and 
based on internal, cross-disciplinary debate. And here the key, more than 
habits and customs, is rational argumentation, reasoning, acknowledging 
rightfulness, finding reasons: because by paraphrasing V. Frank and 
Nietzsche, whoever has a reason finds the how.
truth and justice
This civic ethics is due to two categories. One is cognitive: the truth, 
understood as the validity of knowledge, a validity based on empirical 
proof, on the evidence we have at any given time. The second is justice, 
viewed as impartial treatment with the consent of the affected parties and 
in cases where we have to divide limited resources. We cannot take fair 
decisions without truthful knowledge, so we need the knowledge provided 
to us by the sciences. However, in order to have this information and be 
able to handle it, we need to guarantee the right to truthful knowledge, 
education and the freedom of research and expression, etc., in order to 
be able to give our free consent.
Goodness, according to whom?
However, this civic ethics, at the service of justice and truth, says nothing 
about world views, about quality of life, about goodness. Civic ethics talks 
about truth and justice, but not goodness: here impartiality and pluralism 
must be guaranteed. This means a very close relationship with everyone 
involved in the social services, namely six stakeholders: the patient, the 
family, the professionals (technical staff and caregivers), the organisation, 
the administration and society at large. Good communication among 
them, so that each knows what they need to do, is crucial. Consensus 
about what human dignity is and which rights befall each person based 
on their capacities (both personal and social) is also needed in order to 
later allow for a variety of notions of quality of life, of goodness.
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EThicS of juSTicE
We must foster a civic ethics, minimums based on human rights, which 
is the very content of justice. These rights are primary goods, top priority, 
the precondition making other more preferential goods possible. Rights 
are the minimum goods that any person should be guaranteed in order 
to enjoy a decent life on behalf of which they choose their quality of life. 
However, as mentioned above, a dependent person, a disabled person, 
requires other prior goods and needs other rights.
With the consent of the affected parties
In effect, this civic ethics is cross-cultural ethics with pretensions of 
universality, whose basic content is rights and whose method is deliberation 
and dialogue. In this fair way, the decision has the consent of the affected 
parties, who agree to the decision through information and symmetry 
(Habermas, 2000). Justice needs a procedure for its quest; it requires a 
methodology that is dialogic and deliberative. Thus, the dialogue and 
debate must be organised based on minimum rights that should be ensured 
for everyone.
In the case at hand, however, the people who are the most affected, 
about whom we are deciding much or almost everything, cannot take 
part in this decision-making process. For this reason, we must appeal to 
solidarity as the ineluctable complement to justice because the people 
affected by the decision are unable to have either information or symmetry.
This ethics must be on three levels: the macro level of social and health 
policies and laws on social services; the meso level of organisations, and 
the micro level of interaction between the professional and the patient, in 
the case at hand, of the disabled person and his or her family or guardian.
With these circumstances, the fundamental questions of an ethics 
of justice and solidarity in services caring for individuals with serious 
intellectual disabilities are:
1) What are the rights of individuals with serious intellectual disabilities? 
This is a question about our duties towards them in order to guarantee 
them a decent life, and it entails civic minimums.
2) What are the preferences of individuals with serious intellectual 
disabilities and their families? This is a question about the family’s person 
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maxims and world views and requires an observation of the patient in 
order to ascertain what his particular welfare consists of.
3) What are the organisation and the professionals’ possibilities, either 
enhanced or hindered by the administration and society, of fulfilling these 
demands? This is a question for the ethics of professional and organisational 
responsibility, and a question for social and health policies and the model 
of society we all want to construct.
at the service of dignity in vulnerability
A civic minimum entails ensuring decent living conditions for people 
with very little capacity to ask, demand and require. These people’s rights 
must be quite different: their right to education cannot involve going to 
a normal school, but ensuring that they can maintain a certain degree of 
capacity within their disability should be a right.
The source from which almost all rights emanate is the right to self-
determination, to freedom or autonomy. The people we are discussing 
here require constant, ongoing and extensive support from others: their 
main right is being cared for with dignity in a personalised way.
For quality of life 
A fair life must make the quest for a good life possible. Since people 
with disabilities depend on others (professionals, organisations, families), 
they must find the time and ways of ascertaining how to improve the 
welfare of the disabled individuals, which requires, as we shall see below, 
an ethical attitude, willingness and availability. 
co-responsibility
As citizens, we are responsible for the place that disabled people have 
and occupy in this society; we are responsible for the image we give of 
these people, with the environment that we generate for them and with 
how we treat them. They are people with a very low capacity for self-
determination for two reasons: because of their intellectual disability and 
because they have to live in a residence that must manage a large number 
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of people, professionals, families and residents. While this facilitates their 
dignity and quality of life, it also limits the capacities for individuality. 
We are co-responsible for managing the pluralism and diversity within 
certain civic minimums. And the responsibility is proportional to power 
and knowledge.
professional and organisational ethics 
Social service professionals cannot do this alone, nor can we, all the 
users, without them. Therefore, depositing all the ethics for caring for 
dependency and fostering autonomy into professionals is tantamount 
to demoralising them, to condemning them to being do-gooders who 
want to but cannot alone. For this reason, we must also speak about the 
responsibilities of the organisations or institutions where social service 
professionals work, of their professional associations and of social policy.
at the service of quality care
The purpose of professionals ethics is to legitimise quality. By quality 
we mean fulfilling expectations which are ultimately grouped under the 
categories of welfare and justice.
Quality requires expectations to be fulfilled. An expectation is appropriate 
when it is based on scientific evidence (it is true or false), it fits within the 
civic minimums when they are rights and responsibilities (it is fair or unfair), 
and last but not least, because the order of factors alters the product if it 
is good or bad. In effect, the quality of the professional service lies in the 
patient being satisfied, but as the user may be more or less informed or 
misinformed, the professional has a great deal of say over the quality of his 
services given the status of the laws and the research that only he is aware 
of as an expert in the matter.
 Many factors converge in quality: the user’s satisfaction, the status of 
professional knowledge, the professional’s assessment of the services offered, 
the state of research, the possibilities that the organisation can offer in view 
of its limited resources, efficacy and more. The social service professional 
must keep abreast of the knowledge in his field (laws, therapies), must be 
a reliable source of information on this knowledge and must do justice 
when treating his patients and their families.
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Politicians often arouse unrealistic expectations among citizens (the law 
on dependency) which in the moment of truth cannot be fulfilled because 
there are neither human nor technical resources. On top of this, social 
service workers also face personal pressures (they have to pay mortgages, 
schools, different insurance policies, etc.) and must obey like any other 
worker. However, they are also the ones who work directly, face to face, 
with the patient and the families.
It is the organisation’s job to professionalise the caregivers; they are not 
professionals but mere technicians. Usually whoever spends the most time 
with the patient is not the most technically qualified worker. Making them 
feel professional, and responsible, for a service, for a person, representing the 
organisation, entails telling them that the job they are doing is much more 
than just a job. And this also requires in turn recognition of their value.
Social service professionals gamble with the credibility and trust in the 
profession because, in the end, all exchanges of services rely on trust, the 
main moral resource of any interpersonal relationship. The professional 
is co-responsible, both directly and indirectly: for improving the living 
conditions of the disabled person, directly, and for justice, indirectly. For 
this reason, he is responsible not only for applying the law (and not being 
negligent) and fostering the patient’s welfare; rather he is also responsible 
for not creating a new or greater dependency on the organisation or the 
professional. It must always be ensured that the dependence and/or illness is 
not joined by new ailments, attacking non-malevolence and the beneficence: 
disorientation generated by arbitrariness in treatment augments dependence.
Thus for example, sometimes, for reasons of efficacy, because we have 
to go to work, or misunderstood friendliness, we fasten the buttons of 
the disabled person when he could do it, in his own time obviously, and 
after a few days of not doing it, because it has been done for him, we 
have created a new dependency.
at the service of organisational quality
The mission that legitimises the ethics of any organisation is also the 
quality of the service, but now quality encompasses several different 
professions, many individuals, users, neighbourhoods, regions in which 
the service is provided, and all of this in a specific, highly determined 
economic setting. Although professionals are needed, they cannot be left 
alone: the ethics of the organisation is needed in which they agree upon 
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the care model under which they must work, the coherent discourses that 
guide them and the arguments that must be given for why the families’ 
requests can be granted or not.
The organisation is an important moral agent, and forging an 
organisational ethics requires many factors, including the following:
Working towards a corporate ethos, which is not merely the sum of 
personal styles. Instead, an ethos aims to outline what the organisation 
aims to achieve, how it means to achieve it, that is, the style by which it 
wants to be characterised and, if necessary, distinguished as an organisation 
within the sector, and the care model that everyone working in the 
organisation must promote. The goal is to agree to and explicitly outline 
how hospitality with disabled people is viewed.
An ethical code (with a committee in charge of enforcing it) can be an 
instrument for sharing the values and thereby outline the kind of actions 
and processes that the organisation expects of its staff. However, since we are 
dealing with ethics, the code should not be internal regulations; to achieve 
this, training, empowerment (responsibility is proportional to power) 
and care are needed, not just of the patient but of all the people working 
there. The values of residences are quite similar, but the important thing is 
how they are manifested, because this depends on the problems it has, the 
resources it has to manage them and everyone’s willingness to deal with 
them. This is how agreement is reached on what the organisation considers 
good practice and why, and how it finds the mechanisms to foster this.
To generate participatory democracy: forums for discussion, participation 
and deliberation are needed where conflict is envisioned as a symptom of 
creativity and trust in change and improvement.
in coherence with the ethics of the patient’s family
It would do well to recall that coherence does not allude only to the 
results or consequences. Coherence entails three ingredients: values and 
mission; actions and processes; consequences and impacts. One consequence 
might be that the family is very contented but the professionals believe 
that it is due to the preferential treatment they have received because of 
who or how they are. In this case, there is no coherence with impartiality 
and justice towards the other patients. Coherence is more complex when 
we cannot fall into homogeneous treatment and the family’s values and 
world view must also be taken into account.
135RomáN
ethIcs IN caRegIvINg seRvIces
why aN ethIcs FoR oRgaNIsatIoNs aNd PRoFessIoNaLs?
ThE awarEnESS of cohErEncE and bElonging
Professional and organisational ethics are created only with the 
individuals that are part of the organisation, generating a certain feeling 
or pride of belonging to it. The professional represents and projects the 
organisation; he is the visible face of the organisation, and how and where 
the organisation is going largely depends on him.
Being aware of the degree of professional involvement of a person 
in an organisation is not such a complex undertaking. Simple questions 
like the following offer information on the degree to which the different 
professional ethics fit with the organisations: What does the organisation 
expect of you that you like? What does the organisation expect of you 
that you do not like? What does the organisation not expect of you that 
you would like it to? These questions must also be asked of the recipients 
of the professional service, in the case at hand the families of the disabled 
people we are caring for.
The major enemy of ethics is self-complacency: ethics are not developed 
out of narcissism, they are developed so that we all live together better. 
We develop them based on our condition, which is one of fallibility, and 
organisations must therefore manage their learning extremely well, because 
obviously we have no other alternative, sometimes through getting things 
right, sometimes through getting things wrong and sometimes through 
contradictions.
technical training, training in values and in communication skills
Why do we need this professional and organisational ethics? Because 
professionals have usually received technical training but no training in 
values, at least they have never been told about the values that they use 
and that are involved with the technical skills are taught. This is because 
in a professional service, one that serves people, good intentions are not 
enough, not even with the question of personal self-realisation. One must 
also know whom we are offering the service, and offer it with personal 
treatment. And because common sense, which is the underpinning of the 
traditional way of proceeding, is not enough, and this underpinning changes 
according to the procedures and as the purposes we set for ourselves change.
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Recalling that ethics primarily operates with arguments, we must improve 
the communication skills among professionals, between professionals and 
families, between professionals and the patient, and between professionals 
and the organisation. The fact that the night shift or weekend shift operates 
according to certain rules and the other shifts according to others generates 
a great deal of incoherence and arbitrariness, and therefore mistrust. Why 
do we need this professional and organisational ethics? In the end, it is a 
question of justice, solidarity, quality and trust.
ThE rElaTionShiP wiTh ThE family
The family is directly in charge of the patient and the ones to whom 
we must be accountable, as professionals and organisations, for the status 
of the person they have left in our care.
autonomy: respect for their personal ethics 
Since they are the legal representatives of the patient, we must agree with 
them on many of the actions that we must perform as a centre. Yet we must 
also listen to certain unique family features that stem from their way of living 
and doing things. Here we must guarantee pluralism and strive to respect, 
to the extent possible, their uniqueness, yet always within the minimums 
we have established that guarantee the safety and dignity of the patient.
communication: on treatments, diagnostics and courses of action
We have already said that the family is co-responsible, if they take the 
patient for several days, for shouldering the treatments, medication and 
cautionary measures that must be borne in mind for the personal safety 
of the disabled person. This often requires education by the professional 
because the family is not always aware of what to do.
education on mutual expectations of the organisation and the family
If we want quality care, we must fulfil the family’s expectations, and 
to fulfil them, we must be aware of them. However, these expectations 
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must be educated so that what is desired is responsible. The professional is 
responsible for the quality of his service regardless of the more or less well-
founded expectations of the inexpert, or uninformed, family, or another 
kind of extremely bossy, overly well informed family. Professionals’ role 
as educators is unavoidable. Without the professional’s education, reports, 
appraisals, clarifications of the new developments in a law, improvements 
and skilful use of devices, the family would not know what to do nor 
what they should expect.
rights and responsibilities, understanding and comprehending
As the family, they also have rights and responsibilities, but since these 
people are unique, they must also take charge of the uniqueness not only 
of their family but of what they are responsible for. They have the right 
to come visit the disabled person, but they also have the responsibility 
to visit him because sometimes we think that if they have a right, others 
have responsibilities, yet the issue of rights and responsibilities is always 
reciprocal. This does not always hold true: the right to education also 
implies the right to get educated, not only the right to let others educate 
a person. Similarly, the right to take decisions on the seriously disabled 
family member also implies the right to share the co-responsibility for 
their dignity and quality of life, and since interpersonal relationships are 
crucial for quality of life, the family plays heavily into these interpersonal 
relationships.
ThE rElaTionShiP wiTh ThE PaTiEnT
The patient is the raison d’être of caregiving services, and the patient 
with a serious intellectual disability is a chronic patient. He will be at 
the residence his whole life; it is his home. Thus, we must first of all 
be clearly aware of the importance of the space that he inhabits and the 
time we spend on them. In order to provide quality care we must attach 
importance to the patient and his circumstances, to his surroundings. And 
the surroundings are extremely important. To begin with, we must make 
it clear that the surroundings are not just a space; either the surroundings 
recognise, shape, personalise and harbour or they can be impersonal and 
a kind of non-place. Surroundings which remain in a diagnostic or in 
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the label of violent or aggressive person are dangerous, as they give the 
patients up as lost causes.
With regard to time, we must be capable of finding it (time for 
observation, for getting to know the patients, for interacting with them): 
the excuse that we have no time to reflect on our model of care, on the 
quality and quantity of time we spend with them, is not an argument that 
ethics can accept. If we have to do something, we can do it. Therefore, we 
have to have a reflection on how patients spend their time, on whether 
there is some variation in the activities; how much time we assign to them 
depends on the pleasure they derive from these activities. For example, 
shower time: if we see that a patient really enjoys his showers, we can 
prolong them in order to give him his moment of wellbeing. Let us now 
examine several aspects of interpersonal relationships that must be forged 
with the patient.
caring and touching
The personal dimension of the patient can never be forgotten; they have 
a certain interaction with their environment and are not pure vegetables. 
The patient must be treated as a person, and therefore given attention; 
they must be not subjected to attention but at the centre of this attention. 
The difference lies in shifting from being a mere consumer and observer 
and absolutely passive regarding the services already established, which are 
the same for everyone, to being able to feel that the services are for them 
(with their presence and communication, albeit minimum). Despite his 
disability, the patient often finds ways of being understood in a limited 
way, expressing pleasure, displeasure, satisfaction, esteem and unease.
interaction and sociability
What impersonalises things the most is a lack of communication. For 
this reason, all punishments end up as a kind of exclusion or reclusion that 
hinders human treatment. We often fail to consider the person because 
he does not understand us, because he neither says nor does anything. 
This impersonal treatment denigrates all of us because we are not treating 
the patient with the respect he requires. As Serra very insightfully put it, 
our treatment of the disabled says who we are (Serra, 2008). Trying to 
139RomáN
ethIcs IN caRegIvINg seRvIces
bolster their interaction and sociability via other means, because we are 
overly rational and verbal, implies having an extremely open attitude to 
finding out how and what they are telling us, in their own way.
Since these people have intellectual disabilities, they tend to replace their 
way of interacting with other means: the kind of touch, look, smile. In 
this sense, it is important to ask and probe precisely the person who does 
not ask. These patients who are so dependent are not exactly overbearing; 
even though they are very dependent they do not ask if we do not help 
them. Treating our equals as equals and unequals as unequals, Aristotle 
reminds us, is part of the principle of justice.
careful looking and listening
We said at the beginning that respect for the dignity that every person 
deserves entails an attentive look. Here this attention deserves to be 
particularly developed. This means that we have to try to ascertain what 
the patient wants to tell us with that particular look, or that particular 
sound. And here we come upon an inevitable handicap, being willing to 
accept that we are starting with interpretations of what they are telling us, 
about whether there are improvements or not on what they feel about 
their needs for contact. And the danger here lies in replacing and projecting 
from one’s own subjective vantage point. It is crucial that we know how 
to contrast our versions of events, our subjective interpretations, with inter-
subjective ones, the ones that dovetail with those of other professionals 
and the family, because what we think that we would like people to do 
to us is the result of our circumstances, sensibilities and pleasures, while 
their perspective might be different. Thus, the world viewed from their 
capacity must certainly be different. And it is our responsibility first 
and foremost (primum non nocere) to ensure their safety, their health 
(their disability often comes with other pathologies) and ultimately, for 
example, their privacy. Another person would prioritise privacy before 
safety as normal.
Thus, what happens when thinking about preserving patients’ privacy 
is that we augment their vulnerability, endangering him by their falling in 
the shower or because they have convulsions that we cannot see because 
the shower has curtains to protect their privacy. However, the fact that 
the bathroom does not have shower curtains does not preclude the fact 
that the look must always be decorous. We must know how to prioritise 
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for the sake of their safety. The look and its intention furnish the ethical 
sense; their privacy is not being violated if they are being protected from a 
greater danger. The technical inspectors must be convinced of the unique 
features of these individuals.
sexuality and intimacy
We tend to either neglect their sensual and intimate dimensions or 
simply project them as if they were not disabled. Sometimes the mental 
age of disabled individual means that he does not have a sense of modesty 
or a need for intimate contact, but that is not always so. Comprehensive 
care of the individual includes being attentive to his needs and desires 
and considering what would be best for him. Like the people they are, 
despite their disabilities, they have the dimension of sexuality and a certain 
sense of intimacy. Respect for their integrity entails accepting them as a 
whole: we should not foster a sexual dimension that they do not have, 
nor should we ignore it if it develops (Gafo, 1992).
personalisation and homogenisation 
We must avoid a hyper-regularity of habits (always the same). They 
are people and deserve differentiated treatment within the realm of the 
possible. Routine provides order and balance, but the Greeks said, “nothing 
in excess”: regularity without exceptions, a mechanical regularity turns 
everyone into machines, regardless of who is being served and who is 
being cared for.
Impersonalisation tends to be the result of homogenisation. It is true 
that in a place where many people live together there have to be rules, but 
just as we are capable of understanding a medical prescription for one ill 
person’s food allergies and another patient’s diabetes, in services targeted 
at such severely disabled people we have to personalise the care, which 
includes personalising their habits, even if only minimally. Residences tend 
to be large centres with many professionals and patients. Obviously we 
all have to be accommodated, but the services are there to serve whom? 
The comfort and efficiency of the professionals and organisations, or the 
welfare and quality of care of the patients? Welfare and quality entail 
promoting differentiated and personalised treatment to the extent possible. 
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Everyone the same, scrubbed and polished, everyone at the same time, in 
the same room, leads one to think that the services are organised based 
on the workers’ interests, not based on true the legitimacy, the mission 
of the centres and the exercise of the profession. Finding the balance 
between the patients’ needs, efficiency and excellence in the services and 
personalised treatment is a core challenge.
coNcLusIoNs
We must recall that, just as people deserve respect for their physical 
and moral integrity and have their different dimensions, we must not 
only ensure that they eat, drink, bathe and take their medication, rather 
their interaction, their relationship with their caregivers, with the centre 
staff and with their family is also crucially important. Beyond reason, 
they have dignity and deserve the utmost respect, the utmost attention, 
and this means dignifying their dependence.
The way a society treats its disabled members says a great deal about 
its solidarity. And recalling J. Rawls and his veil of ignorance (Rawls, 
1995), everyone, if unaware of their biological-social lottery, would choose 
to live in a fair, socially conscious society rather than a random society. 
In the former, the most fortunate ones in the biological-social lottery 
have to help minimise the disadvantages of the less fortunate ones in that 
lottery. In contrast, in a random society the law of the jungle prevails, 
animal law, and in this kind of society it is meaningless to speak about 
ethics or human dignity; in it, the disabled are excluded through simple 
natural selection.
The incidence of luck in a person is inversely proportion to the level 
of justice in the society in which one lives; it is bad luck to be disabled, 
but it would be even more unjust for this random issue to condemn 
the disabled person to undignified treatment. We must keep fighting on 
behalf of individuals with serious intellectual disabilities in order to ensure 
that they do not lose too many degrees of interaction; we must continue 
to encourage them to fight for life because it is worth it, despite their 
condition; we must fight against diagnostitis and determinisms that dictate 
that if one cannot live a normal life and function normally in society, life 
is no longer worth it. As long as there is someone who makes them feel, 
in their own way, that they are worthy and will find their quality. Frankl 
said it best: “whoever finds a why can handle any how. A society that 
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treats disabled people as worthy is giving them a why so that among all 
of us (they are dependent) we can discover how to do it” (Frankl, 1980).
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